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DATA BREACH LITIGATION & EVALUATING

STANDING
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional requirements for Article III standing present a
complicated problem in the evolving area of data breach litigation.' When
data stored by businesses and individuals has been accessed or has
heightened vulnerability to improper access, it is difficult to fulfill standing
absent a correlating personal identity theft. 2 The fear that vulnerable data
could be used for identity theft presents courts with difficulty in determining
Article III standing and when it is successfully met. 3 This challenge is

1 See U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2 (noting requirements for standing include imminent injury). The
requirements for injury and proper Article 111 standing are explained as:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; -between Citizens of different
States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.

&

Id. See also Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979) (recognizing parties'
contentions must present real, substantial controversies). The difference between abstract
questions, and case or controversy, is one of degree rather than a bright line rule. Id.; In re Horizon
Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632-33 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining standard to
review motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when challenging standing). In determining whether
a complaint sufficiently alleges an injury-in-fact, the standard requires a showing of some indicia
of injury. Id. at 633; Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (examining
differences between Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals). Dismissals under Rule
12(b)(1) are a challenge to a court's jurisdiction, while 12(b)(6) dismissals are a ruling on the merits
with res judicata effects. Id.; Ernest Schopler, 40 L. Ed. 2d 783 (2nd ed. 2012) (noting federal courts
adjudicate only actual cases or controversies). A litigant must have suffered or threatened with
facing an imminent injury. Id.
2 See Identity Theft, DEP'T OF JUST. FRAUD SEC., https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/identity-theft/identity-theft-and-identity-fraud (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) (defining identity
theft). "Identity theft and identity fraud are terms used to refer to all types of crime in which
someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person's personal data in some way that involves
fraud or deception, typically for economic gain." Id.; see also Class Actions, MORGAN
MORGAN, https://www.forthepeople.com/class-action-lawyers/data-breaches/ (last visited Oct.
30, 2016) (outlining prominent recent data breach cases).
COMM'N,
FED.
TRADE
Theft,
of
Identity
Warning
Signs
3 See
(last visited Nov. 3, 2016)
https://www.identitytheft.gov/Warning-Signs-of-Identity-Theft
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unique to sensitive personal information, since the time of imminent injury
is extremely difficult to pinpoint before injury has occurred.4
Article H1 standing should not be conferred on litigants in classaction data breach lawsuits if the injury is not sufficient to establish orthodox
standing.' Standing will not be found in cases where injury is no more than
speculative in nature.6 Furthermore, the discussion will show that expanding
Article m standing for online identity theft prior to evidence showing actual
injury would be manifestly unfair to potential defendants.' The dual
requirements of proving an injury-in-fact require courts to utilize a bifurcated
analysis to ensure they are correctly considering standing before allowing a
suit to continue on the merits.8 In conclusion, the determination of Article
m standing in class actions for data breach litigation should ensure fairness
(highlighting indications of stolen identity will include monitoring bank activity and medical
records). The challenge is many of the safeguards and preventative measures seem burdensome
when there is no actual identity theft. Id.
4 See Kevin J. O'Brien, Encryption Flaw Makes Phones Possible Accomplices in Theft, NY
TIMES (July 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/technology/encryption-flaw-makesphones-possible-accomplices-in-theft.html (warning cell phone's can pick up viruses allowing theft
of personal information during mobile purchases). Cell phones used to complete transactions can
often be susceptible to viruses that are capable of actively skirting security measures. Id.
5 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (acknowledging standing requires
injury-in-fact that is concrete and imminent rather than hypothetical). The Lujan Court identified
three elements that must be present to establish constitutional standing. Id. "Article II requires, as
an irreducible minimum, that a plaintiff allege (1) an injury that is (2) 'fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct' and that is (3) 'likely to be redressed by the requested
relief."' Id. at 590. The Court explained that at the pleading stage, general allegations of the injury
caused by the defendants met standing requirements. Id. at 561. In Lujan, environmental groups
challenged regulations concerning the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 557-59. The regulations
would negatively affect their ability to go abroad and view endangered species. Id. at 562-63. The
Court reasoned because the endangered species viewing was at some indefinite future time, it was
not an imminent injury. Id. at 564-67. The Supreme Court held the group failed to show an injuryin-fact. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566-68. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to contest the
regulations. Id. at 566.
6 See id. at 564 (explaining imminence is elastic concept meant to ensure litigant faces
impending injury); see also Via Mat Int'l S. Am. Ltd. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2006) (discussing statutory standing requirements).
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (requiring concrete and particularized injury for standing
purposes); see also Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1273
(11th Cir. 2003) (explaining traceable injury standard less stringent than showing proximate cause
of injury). Indirectly causing the plaintiffs harm satisfies this fairly traceable standard as well. Id.
8 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016) (holding Ninth Circuit incorrectly
applied injury-in-fact requirement). In Spokeo, petitioner operated a people search engine, which
generated profiles of individuals. Id. at 1544. Respondent, Thomas Robins, realized his profile
contained incorrect information and filed a federal class-action alleging Spokeo intentionally failed
to comply with FCRA's requirements. Id. at 1546. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal, finding the injury was particularized to affect the plaintiff in an individual way. Id. The
Supreme Court found this was improper for testing injury in fact because the Ninth Circuit did not
incorporate the independent "concreteness" requirement. Id. at 1549-50. Concreteness is a different
requirement than particularized injury. Id.
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to defendants who have otherwise not caused the injury of personal identity
theft.9
As society continues to rely on expanding technology in daily life,
the requirements of constitutional standing should be clear for potential
class-action lawsuits.10 As the techniques for hacking become more
advanced, the need for clearer guidelines is necessary to help courts maintain
uniformity." The challenges courts face should be rectified by drawing
concise lines when imminent injury arises in instances of vulnerability for
potential identity theft.1 2

In 2013, the Supreme Court clarified the application of standing
requirements to areas of data breach litigation.13 After a discussion on the
history of this issue, the analysis will discuss why it is imperative that Article
III standing be held to a more stringent requirement, and dismiss cases that
do not show imminent injury for lack of standing.14 It is imperative that
courts require a showing of imminent injury in order to ensure that blameless

9 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.
454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (noting litigants have always been required to show standing). "[Alt an
irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority 'to show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct
of the defendant . . . ."' Id. at 472. (citations omitted).
10 See Joseph Cox, Are Data Breaches Becoming More Common?, VICE (July 28, 2016),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/data-breaches-vigilante-pw (providing reasons for increased
data breaches). One indispensable reason for the rising occurrence of data breaches is the growing
field of data collection and trade. Id.
1 See Jeannie Warner, Houston, We Have a (Cyber) Problem, WHITEHAT SEC. (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.whitehatsec.com/blog/houston-we-have-a-cyber-problem/ (noting increased
need for cyber security in hospitals and healthcare institutions due to data vulnerability).
Healthcare is a particularly vulnerable area for data breach issues given the amount of information
stored electronically. Id.
12 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC 794 F.3d 688, 693-96 (7th Cir. 2015)
(explaining injury requirements); see also When Information Is Lost or Exposed, FED. TRADE
COMM'N, https://www.identitytheft.gov/PDFs/DataBreach.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2016)
(outlining steps to take when information is accessed online to eliminate chance of identity theft).
Based on the particular type of information vulnerable, steps include a credit freeze, monitoring
credit reports, changing account passwords and requesting new cards. Id. These steps are suggested
to minimize chances of identity theft after personal identifying information has been accessed. Id.
13 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (explaining plaintiff must present sufficient
evidence of each element of standing). See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409
(2013) (requiring plaintiff must face an injury that is impending). Where individuals seek to
establish standing based on imminent injury, the Court has made clear that the threatened injury
must be certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact and allegations of possible future injury are
not sufficient. Id.
14 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (highlighting injury must be fairly
traceable to injury being challenged). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of'
showing they meet the elements of standing. Id.
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defendants are not liable for speculative data breaches not caused by their
conduct."
II. HISTORY
Article 1H of the United States Constitution requires that a plaintiff
establish three elements in order to have standing to invoke jurisdiction of
the federal courts: injury-in-fact, causation and redressibility.' 6 The main
element that will be at focus is injury-in-fact, as it poses the most issues for
potential data breach litigation.17 These elements can cause standing to be
restrictive in some instances." The courts have recognized these standing
requirements are constitutionally provided and therefore, absent
interpretation differences, the requirements are to be followed by courts
regardless of the circumstances in the case at hand.19 Judicially defined
standing requirements can be overtly general, sometimes leaving litigants
with no reliable way of accurately predicting whether a court will find the
standing requirements have been met.20 The standing doctrine has been

15 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) (explaining broadening
threshold requirement to actual injury is different than abandoning requirement). There is a
necessary requirement that the acting party have some personal interest. Id. A federal court cannot
disregard this requirement, as that would be overstepping the role of the court. Id.; see also Wuliger
v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 796 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding lower court failed to focus on if
defendant caused plaintiff's injury).
16 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (outlining requirements for standing). See also Lexmark Int'l,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390-91 (2014) (acknowledging
proximate causation is not required element of Article III standing); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (requiring private party demonstrate concrete injury caused by defendant).
17 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (clarifying necessity of each element). As the Lujan Court
discussed, "each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of the litigation." Id.
1 See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork. J., concurring)
(discussing standing requirement). The doctrine of standing:

has loftier goals: standing and the other justiciability doctrines relate in part, and in
different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the
powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.
Id.
19 See Whitmore, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (explaining Article III requirements are imposed
constitutionally instead of traditional rules of practice). It is not the province of the courts to resolve
public policy issues and expand or restrict the constitutional requirements based on the case at hand
and the notions of fairness. Id.
20 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 221-24 (1988)
(acknowledging judicial interpretation of Article III's requirements led to incoherent legal
doctrine).
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criticized for its requirement of an injury-in-fact. 2 1 The actual injury
requirement is aligned with Article II's goal of resolving legal questions
22
conclusively with an understanding of the consequence of judicial action.
The requirement of standing has facilitated courts in assessing which
claims may be adjudicated. 23 Although the standing requirement has not
been easy to apply, standing is nevertheless required for fairness to
defendants .24 The courts have consistently held that speculation will not
suffice to invoke the power of courts to adjudicate claims .25 If an injury is
indirect, or cannot be directly traced to the conduct of the defendants, it
makes it difficult to meet the minimum causation requirement of Article ll.26
One criticism of standing has been that the requirement of injury in
fact is misleading; this is because an individual genuinely believing she
suffered an injury is not sufficient. 2 7 Although scholars have criticized the
ambiguously defined standing requirements, there has been no effort by
Congress to clarify standing for plaintiffs .28 There have been arguments for

21 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975) (requiring plaintiff suffer "distinct and
palpable injury" to establish standing); see also Fletcher,supranote 20, at 229-32 (arguing standing
doctrine should not require injury-in-fact). The doctrine mandates that a plaintiff must suffer some
injury before a court can provide relief. Id.
22 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that actual injury requirement serves "implicit policies
embodied in Article Il"). Requiring plaintiffs suffer an actual injury also prevents concerned third
parties from asserting the rights of others. Id. at 473; see also United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (observing relaxing standing
requirements would allow judicial process to become "vehicle for value interests"); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (insisting plaintiff demonstrate adverse effects limiting court
proceedings to litigants with direct stake in outcome).
23 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923) (explaining injury alleged was
burden of taxation in support of unconstitutional regime). The Court determined any injury the
plaintiff suffered from the tax burden was "remote, fluctuating and uncertain." Id. The Court
reasoned that any plaintiff must be able to show they specifically suffered a direct injury from the
result of an enforcement of a law, rather than demonstrating a statute harmed them as a member of
the general public. Id. at 488.
24 See Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine" and Foreign
Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1138 n. 11 (1970) (acknowledging concept of standing has
provided scholars with 'considerable difficulty').
25 See Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,44 (1976) (highlighting prior
decisions where speculation was found to be insufficient to establish standing); see also Warth, 422
U.S. at 507-08 (holding plaintiff lacked standing because alleged injury not attributable to
challenged statute); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (recognizing requested
relief would have been speculative at best to redress claim brought).
26 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (noting indirect injury does not deprive plaintiff standing but
makes it difficult to meet requirements).
27 See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 233 (mentioning injury-in-fact does not allow recovery for
subjective, but speculative, injury).
28 See Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting plaintiff required to
establish standing with requisite proof); see also Thomas L. Casagrande, The "Dawn Donut Rule ":
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limiting congressional power under Article 1H, understanding that Congress
has plenary authority over federal court jurisdiction.29 In class actions, the
standing requirement denotes that the named plaintiff have claims against
each defendant.3 0 There has been a split on whether courts should rule on
the class certification first, then treat the class as relevant for Article III
instead of doing a separate inquiry."
Current standing requirements prohibit suits in many areas in which
Congress has previously authorized. 32 Congress has some ability to further
clarify standing,, but it is doubtful they will choose to reform the control the
Court exercises over these issues. 33 Scholars have begun looking for
alternatives to orthodox standing, and have argued when the executive and
legislative branches bring suit, they can lack standing under Article 1H.34

Still Standing (Article III, That Is) Even With the Rise of The Internet, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 723
(2000) (arguing standing inquiry for the last thirty-five years evaluated complainant's dispute
merits); Elliott, supra note 18, at 163-64 (noting Congress could enact statutes expanding standing
by creating legislative findings of standing); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest:
Justiciabilityand Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1310 (1995) (contending standing rules
ensure fairness by protecting against litigants manipulating system).
29 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569,
1569-70 (1990) (noting arguments for limiting congressional power). One limitation mentioned is
courts having jurisdiction over all cases within federal judicial power. Id.
30 See Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding Art.
III standing
in class action suits requires injury caused by all defendants). The court noted standing is a
prerequisite to class certification and must be established prior to any certification. Id. at 65.
31 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (recognizing injury first
element necessary for standing); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (noting
allegations of future injury not sufficient for standing).
32 See Elliot, supra note 18, at 164 (noting critics of standing doctrine label this
restrictive
standing requirement abuse of judicial discretion). These limits make anti-regulatory challenges
difficult to come to the court. Id. at 165.
33 See U.S. CONST. ART. I §§ 1-2 (noting Article 1H recognizes right to create inferior courts
and regulate jurisdiction of federal courts); see also Elliot, supra note 18 at 164 (emphasizing
Court's restrictive view of standing); Brian F. Havel, The Constitution In an Era of Supranational
Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REv. 257, 293-94 (2000) (observing Article III includes permanent
professional security of judges and congressional control over judicial system).
34 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,2664 (2013) (noting state legislator may satisfy
standing requirements despite private party lacking standing); see also Trevor W. Morrison, Private
Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 627 (2005) (explaining
federal courts adjudicate government actions where private parties would lack injury-in-fact); Tara
L. Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1314 (2014) (explaining
standing of executive and legislative branches must have affirmative authority for their actions).
The standing for the executive branch and legislature branch must instead be determined by the
provisions conferring their power. Id.
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III. FACTS
The history of applying Article E requirements to data breach
litigation has not been clear, resulting in circuits splits when determining if
35
standing has been shown in data breach cases. A majority of circuits found
plaintiffs satisfied the standing requirement after data was accessed for the
36
Absent a showing the accessed
subsequent potential identity theft.
information was used, courts have difficulty determining when injury is
imminent.3 7 The Federal Courts of Appeal began attempting to create clear
guidelines in determining when data breaches cause identity theft.38
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held sufficient injury was found
for standing when plaintiffs were at an increased risk of harm, following a
theft of a laptop containing information that was subsequently used."
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found injury was sufficient
for standing when the plaintiffs were at an increased risk of data theft after

3 Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F3d 38,43-46 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding no injury-infact when unauthorized person accessed but did not misuse plaintiffs' data), with Krottner v.
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding injury-in-fact when plaintiffs pled
risk of harm following theft of laptop containing personal data). In both of these cases, the
plaintiffs' data was accessed by one or more unauthorized third parties. Id.
36 See Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding injuryin-fact satisfied after information was accessed by sophisticated hacker). The increased risk of
identity theft was sufficient to confer standing, despite the plaintiffs failure to allege any financial
loss to their accounts, or that they were the victim of identity theft. Id. The Court found standing
due to the injury-in-fact of future harm that would not have occurred absent the defendant's actions.
Id. at 634. In reaching these decisions, the Court looked to the Second and Sixth circuits, which
addressed increased risk of future medical and environmental injury. Id. at 635.
37 See Resnick v. AvMed Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323-27 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting identity theft
resulting from data breach has standing where both plaintiffs' information used). The plaintiffs
suffered identity theft and monetary damages, which constituted an injury-in-fact under the law.
Id. The defendant failing to secure the plaintiffs' personal information was sufficient to fairly trace
their injuries for the purposes of Article III standing. Id. at 1324. Injuries alleged included the
sensitive information being used to open bank and financial accounts. Id. at 1326. The court
reasoned to prove a data breach caused identity theft, the pleadings must show a nexus between the
two instances beyond merely stating the time of the two incidents. Id. at 1327.
38 See Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Aliance, 254 F. Appx 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting sufficient facts creating link between breach and personal identity injury). A causal
relationship between data breach and identity theft is found where "(1) [plaintiff] gave [the
defendant] his personal information; (2) the identity fraud incidents began six weeks after the hard
drives containing [defendant's] customers' personal information were stolen; and (3) [plaintiff]
previously had not suffered any such incidents of identity theft." Id. The court also noted
allegations only of both time and sequence are not enough to establish causation: "purely temporal
connections are often insufficient to establish causation .... [H]owever, proximate cause is
supported not only by the temporal but also by the logical relationship between the two events."
Id. at 668.
39 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining laptop
stolen and its information used).
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their information was accessed, but not yet used.40 In the Seventh Circuit
case, an important factor was the investigation revealed the individual who
completed the hack was sophisticated and advanced in accessing vulnerable
online information, despite the information having not been used.4 1
Although the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing, they did
not have damages necessary for purposes of their state-law claims .42 Courts
have had to determine if pleadings contain more than evidence of future
harm. 4 3
Because an increased risk of identity theft involves a future injury,
some jurisdictions have decided the plaintiff does not suffer an actual and
imminent injury because the identity theft may not happen, thus creating
speculation that of what Article I is meant to prohibit." The imminence
requirement is intended to ensure the courts do not adjudicate hypothetical

40 See Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631-33 (7th Cir. 2007)
(noting breach
found to have accessed information of users and bank subsequently alerted).
41 See id. at 632 (finding scope and manner support finding evidence
intrusion sophisticated
as opposed to novice). The plaintiffs did not allege they incurred any financial loss to their
accounts, nor did anyone in the class claim they had already been the victim of identity theft due to
the accessed information. Id. The plaintiffs requested credit monitoring damages to avoid loss and
damages from identity theft, and attempts to avoid incurring expenses from potential identity theft.
Id. at 632-33; see also Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (2006)
(holding no existing state law supports plaintiff's purchase of credit monitoring devices established
cognizable loss).
42 See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634-40 (holding there was no basis for relief and insufficient
injury).
43 See Willingham v. Glob. Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01 157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27764, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013) (finding no precedent holds without further evidence
of identity theft monitoring was injury-in-fact). When there is no actual harm, its imminence must
be established despite not proving its extent. Id. at 19; see also Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22373, at *25 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (noting alleged injury of increased
identity theft risk too speculative based on facts of case).
4 See Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96587 at *10-11 (W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (noting "fulcrum upon which these decisions pivot is
whether the plaintiffs have expressed an injury sufficient to proceed past a motion to dismiss"); Cf.
Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding compensatory payment to prevent
future identity theft was injury-in-fact). The Sixth Circuit held that the increased risk of identity
theft and monitoring satisfied the requirement for constitutional standing. Id. at 438; Brittingham
v. Cerasimo, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649-50 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (noting injury requirement can be
satisfied with threat of future harm). The defendant argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring this case because they did not have actual financial injuries, and a violation of Fair and
Accurate Credit Transaction Act, ("FACTA") is not an injury sufficient for standing. Id. at 648.
The plaintiffs argued that FACTA is a statute that authorizes lawsuits for violation, and does not
require actual proof of injury in the case of a violation. Id. The defendant's alleged failure to secure
the card information means the he failed to limit the risk of identity theft. Id.
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injuries." Further, even if the plaintiffs have constitutional standing, the next
issue may be finding a basis for relief.46
When the risk of future identity theft was disputed in the Eleventh
Circuit for the first time, the court determined if the injury is not likely to
occur immediately, then prospective relief is not sufficient for standing.4 7 If
there is no actual injury, and therefore no Article m standing, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claim.48 Standing must
be based on a concrete injury that is not speculative and is traceable to the
defendant.4 9 The Eleventh Circuit seemingly drew a distinction that a
45 See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) (holding potential
injury regarding future reelections too remote to establish standing); see also Pub. Interest Research
Group of NJ., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 122 (3rd Cir. 1997) (noting
imminence necessary to prevent speculation).
46 See Holmes, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96587, at *13-14 (noting even when courts find
standing, still must find basis for relief); see also Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266 at *5 (D. NJ. July 31,2006) (noting credit monitoring costs resulting
from lost financial information did not constitute injury for standing); Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No.
4:06CV00485, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72477 at *8-10, (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (stating plaintiff
pleads only increased risk of identity theft rather than concrete damage); Shafran v. HarleyDavidson, 07 Civ. 01365, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22494 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008) (stating
"Courts have uniformly ruled that the time and expense of credit monitoring to combat an increased
risk of future identity is not, in itself, an injury that the law is prepared to remedy."). Plaintiff failed
to show an actual injury that would allow damages to be awarded. Id.
47 See Badish v. RBS Worldpay, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-0033-CAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145301, *13-14 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2010) (noting Eleventh Circuit has not determined standing for
future identity theft risk and mitigation costs). Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held when a plaintiff cannot show immediate injury, the plaintiff does not have standing even if he
has suffered a past injury. Id. Several other courts have reviewed data breach, where risk of future
injury incurs mitigation costs, and a majority of those courts ruled "alleged damages are not
sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article I standing." Id. at 13. A
distinguishing factor is the mitigation expenses are sufficient for standing if the complaint alleges
that identity theft actually occurred. Id. Here, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because there was not sufficient injury for standing, just future potential injury. Id. at
16.
48 See Holmes, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96587 at *30-31 (noting identity theft does not
constitute injury where only harm is increase in unwanted correspondence); see also Badish v. RBS
Worldpay, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-0033-CAP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145301 *16 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5,
2010) (noting lack of injury equals no standing and court must dismiss case); Randolph v. ING Life
Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, at 1-3 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (alleging substantial risk of identity
theft). Compare McLoughlin v. People's United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944 (VLB), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 78065, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (noting established standing for risk of identity
theft from security breaches), with Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc. 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051
(distinguishing standing requirement rooted in Constitution, courts' reluctance to examine recent
trends when deciding standing), and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)
(noting certainly impending injury satisfies standing requirement)
49 See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting allegations must
be fairly traceable to conduct of defendants). The plaintiffs were victims of identity theft after their
unencrypted laptops containing sensitive information were stolen. Id. Despite plaintiffs' efforts to
secure their information, the lack of sophisticated security left them vulnerable when the laptops
were stolen. Id.
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plaintiff who suffers identity theft without economic harm has standing,
whereas a plaintiff who alleges future harm would not. 0
In Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA," a landmark decision, the Court
analyzed the requirement of standing in cases regarding data breach
litigation. The challenge before the Court was finding standing based on a
substantial risk that harm will occur, which prompted the plaintiffs to incur
costs to mitigate or avoid the harm even where it is not certain the harms
they identify will come about.52 The plaintiffs argued data breach targets
personal information; and therefore a reasonable inference can be drawn that
the hackers will use the victims' data for fraudulent purposes." The Court
analyzed the scope of Article m in relation to standing requirements in this
instance. 54

5o See Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-22800-UIU, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186556, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2012) (noting cases suggest distinction would be between
speculative cases and actual injury without monetary loss). Burrows failed to obtain his tax refund
due to a fraudulent filing as a result of theft of his information. Id. at *7; see also Hammond v.
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71996, at *4 (S.D.N.Y June 25, 2010) (noting
several courts including federal district courts "in Arkansas, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio and the
District of Columbia, have determined that the potential risk of identity theft resulting from loss of
personal information is not an 'injury-in-fact' within the meaning of Article II . . . ."). The courts
have dismissed these cases because they lack standing as required under Art. II. Id. at 5. Other
courts in similar cases found standing but concluded for various reasons that it is "not a legally
cognizable claim." Id.; see also Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp.2d 684, 689 (S.D. Ohio 2006)
(explaining injury-in-fact in identity theft). In elaborating on the injury for identity theft, Judge
Frost stated:

In the identity theft context, courts have embraced the general rule that an alleged
increase in risk of future injury is not an "actual or imminent" injury. Consequently,
courts have held that plaintiffs do not have standing, or have granted summary judgment
for failure to establish damages in cases involving identity theft or claims of negligence
and breach of confidentiality brought in response to a third party theft or unlawful access
to financial institution.
Id.
51 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
52 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413-14 (alleging plaintiffs' risk of identity theft exceeds
mere
speculation). Respondents hoped to have authorized surveillance declared unconstitutional. Id. at
401. Respondents further asserted that injury-in-fact is established because there is a reasonable
likelihood their information can be accessed in the future. Id. at 401-02.
5 See id. at 413 (noting this inference can be permissibly made). In 1978, Congress enacted
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, ("FISA"), to act as governmental surveillance of
communications. Id. at 401. The framework for foreign intelligence surveillance is separate from
the framework for regular domestic police issues and otherwise ordinary crime. Id. When Congress
enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, it established new sources of intelligence collection
authority, which did not require the government to show probable cause that the target of the
surveillance is a foreign power. Id. at 403. The plaintiffs brought an action to challenge the
constitutionality of the act. Id.
54 See id. at 407 (noting Article M's purpose is to limit jurisdiction to certain "'cases' and
'controversies"'). One element of the case or controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must
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The Court determined that future information use is too speculative
to satisfy the constitutional requirements of injury in order to meet
standing." Additionally, the plaintiffs wanted to establish standing because
of the cost of protecting the confidentiality of their communications.56
However, the Court determined that the argument by the respondents failed
to show the injury-in-fact was sufficient because of the reasonable likelihood
The argument that
their communications would be intercepted. 7
is too speculative to
cannot
communications will be reasonably intercepted
establish injury-in-fact.5

1

The respondents' alternative argument of the cost to mitigate
damages is also not sufficiently aligned with the Second Circuit's reasonable
likelihood requirement.59 The decision in Clapper determined standing was
not found because there was an insufficient demonstration that the fear of
future injury was "certainly impending," and that standing cannot be based
establish standing to sue. Id. The role of Article III standing is to prevent the judicial process from
being used to dilute the powers of the political branches. Id. (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488 (2009)). The standing requirement is pertinent to the case, as scrutiny must be
heightened when deciding if an act of another branch of government was unconstitutional. Id.
55 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401-02 (noting future injury is too speculative to suggest threatened
injury is impending); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (noting injury must
be impending and concrete enough to be more than hypothetical).
56 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. at 401-02 (noting alternative argument surveillance
forces them to take protective measures). The court determined the respondents could not create
standing by choosing to make costly decisions based on speculative future harm. Id.
57 See id. at 410 (noting Second Circuit's objectively reasonable likelihood standard
inconsistent with certainly impending requirement to constitute injury-in-fact). The chain of
contingencies would not allow respondents to show injury-in-fact. Id. Respondents' argument rests
on speculation that:
(1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with
whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its
authority under section 1881(a) rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3)
the Article m judges who serve on the [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] will
conclude that the Government's proposed surveillance procedures satisfy the section
1881(a)'s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the
Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents' contacts;
and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Government
intercepts. As discussed below, respondents' theory of standing, which relies on a highly
attenuated chain of possibilities, does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury
must be certainly impending.
Id.
5
See id. at 413-14 (determining speculation does not establish injury is "certainly
impending").
59 See id. (noting Second Circuit's analysis improperly allowed respondents to establish
standing by asserting fear of surveillance). This improperly allowed the fundamental requirements
of Article m to be more relaxed because the harm is not certainly impending. Id. at 1151. The
Court reasoned that it had incentive to engage in many of the countermeasures that it was now
taking. Id. at 417.
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only on mitigation costs.60 In dissenting, Justice Breyer reasons that the high
likelihood these communications will be intercepted is a result of the
plaintiffs' motive to engage in this conversation, as well as the government's
motives to conduct surveillance. 6 1 The dissent also distinguishes the prior
phrases the court has used to discuss the imminence concept for standing.6 2
This case is considered a landmark decision for distinguishing what is
required for standing for data breach cases; future injury is not sufficient for
standing if the injury is not necessarily imminent. 63
Post-Clapper,courts must now determine the speculative nature of
the claims, and if the chain of future injury is both imminent and directly
related to the defendants' actions.' Many courts found the Clapperdecision
clarified that alleging an increased risk of identity theft does not equate a
proper injury. 65 A delay in notifying plaintiffs of a security breach, without

60 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 422 (noting respondents' arguments did not successfully establish
standing). The dissent argued that the Court recognized there is no precise test, and that the case
or controversy is a matter of degree. Id. The dissent held that the considerations, including the
record and inferences, show a high likelihood the government would intercept some of these
communications under statute 1881(a). Id. at 425-26.
61 See id. at 427-28 (noting government has motive to conduct surveillance of conversations
of this kind). The government's past behavior shows that it has the motive and capacity to look at
this type of conversation with detainees in Guantanamo and had the capacity to do so. Id. at 429.
The dissent argued that the idea the injury is certainly impending has never been the touchstone of
standing. Id.
62 See id. at 431-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting Court has used phrases such as "reasonable
probability" or "realistic danger"). These differences tend to show the elastic nature of the
imminence concept. Id. The dissent points to other areas of law where the Court has found standing
from danger of sustaining direct injury in the future. Id. at 433 (quoting Pennell v. San Jose, 485
U.S. 1,8 (1988)). Probabilistic injuries have been found to be sufficient for standing as well. Id.
The dissent also argues the majority's reliance on Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) was
misplaced because that case involved a prisoner challenging the validity of another prisoner's death
penalty. Id. at 439. This is distinguishable because in the instant case the plaintiffs are directly
subjected to the future injury. Id. The word "certainly" contained in "certainly impending" does
not require absolute certainty, but rather a reasonable probability. Id. at 439-40.
63 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646,654 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (noting
plaintiffs rely on arguments similar to Clapper). The increased risk of identity theft, fraud, or
medical fraud is not an injury-in-fact. Id. Although plaintiffs argue they are almost ten times more
likely to be victims of fraud or theft, this does not show how likely they are to become victims. Id.
64 See id. (noting speculative nature of injury is evidenced by fact that occurrence depends on
independent actors). "The U.S. Supreme Court is reluctant to find standing if the injury-in-fact
requires actions of independent decision makers." Id. at 655 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413).
65 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *7
(N.D. I. Sep. 3, 2013) (explaining certainly impending injury can establish injury-in-fact for
purposes of standing); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992) (clarifying
plaintiff bears burden of establishing standing); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292, 300 (7th
Cir. 2000) (demonstrating plaintiff bears burden of showing injury-in-fact traceable to actions of
defendants).
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more, still does not equate to a proper injury-in-fact. 66 Further, the Supreme
Court made clear in Clapperthat mitigation costs for future identity theft are
not grounds for standing. 67 However, monetary losses stemming from the
alleged access of data have are sufficient for standing.68 These requirements
help provide fairness to defendants who have not caused any injury. 69 This
requirement protects defendants because it requires an injury be imminent,
and directly attributed to their actions.7 0
The issue of standing is simplified when identity theft results in
actual injury, such as monetary loss." Further, standing is even less
problematic when plaintiffs can show injury is imminent and was caused

66 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *8 (indicating
complaint did not indicate plaintiffs suffered impending or substantial risk of injury). Hackers stole
credit card information of numerous Barnes & Noble's customers, but only one customer
experienced fraudulent charges, which stopped after she contacted her credit card company. Id. at
*2-3. Based on that data breach, the Plaintiffs filed a claim for a number of different types of
damages including loss of privacy and expenses incurred in efforts to mitigate the increased risk of
identity theft or fraud. Id. at *4. The claim of actual injury in the form of a loss of privacy was
insufficient to establish standing. Id. at * 11. The expenses for mitigating the increased risk of
identity theft were also not sufficient for standing. Therefore, those expenses would not qualify as
actual injuries under Clapper. Id. at *1.
67 See id. at *12 (noting mitigation expenses are insufficient as actual injuries even despite
subjective fear). The court also found increased risk of identity theft was insufficient to establish
the plaintiffs standing absent more evidence of imminent injury. Id. The court dismissed the
complaint because no claim of relief could be granted. Id. at *6. "In order to have suffered an actual
injury, [plaintiff] must have had an unreimbursed charge on her credit card." Id. at * 16.
68 See In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014)
(standing sufficient for unlawful charges, restricted bank accounts, or inability to pay bills); see
also In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 527 (N.D. 1ll. 2011) (holding
plaintiffs' losses from fraudulent account withdrawals were actual injuries).
69 See Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. No. 14-cv-4787, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171142, at *9 (N.D. 111. Dec. 10, 2014) (finding no reason to believe identity theft protection was
necessary after plaintiff canceled affected card). Plaintiff did not allege identity theft had occurred;
they merely stated because of security breaches it could happen which is a claim too speculative
for imminent harm. See id. As a result, the potential for identity theft to occur in future years was
not sufficient to find standing in that instance. Id. There was no reason to continue paying for
identity theft protection after plaintiff canceled the card because the potential risk was moot. See
id. at *10.
70 See In re Zappos.com, 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 956 (D. Nev. 2015) (explaining probability of
impending harm reduces as time passes without alleged future harm occurring). The increased
threat of identity theft from the breach did not constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing,
because years passed without anyone claiming harm occurred. Id. at 958-59.
71 See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (noting presence of
existing and distinct harms). Enslin is distinguishable from Clapper because the plaintiff had
already suffered actual harm, including alleged theft of funds from his accounts. Id.; see also
Holmes v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 5:08-CV-00205-R, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96587 at *5
(W.D. Ky. July 12, 2012) (holding plaintiffs suffered injury from having to expend time and money
protecting their identities).
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directly by the defendant. 7 2 A determination of standing in identity theft can
be made by using an analysis of the likelihood the hacker would have known
to use the information. 73 Although a complaint may allege a future injury, it
must also allege something more concrete in order to show injury is
imminent. 74 An elevated risk of identity theft does not necessarily satisfy the
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
injury-in-fact requirement.7 1
prolonged use of credit monitoring devices may be a significant factor in
assessing if an injury exists..7 6
Cyber technology has become necessary for a business to function
in modem society and this has undoubtedly been the primary reason for the
increase in recorded data breaches.77 Some courts have held loss of
electronic data does not amount to a loss of physical or "tangible" property.78
Given the increasing rate of reported death breaches in the past ten years, the

72 See United States v. De La Cruz, 835 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting evidence sufficiently
established identity theft where defendant used victim's name and date of birth). Evidence showed
the defendant used the victim's information to obtain unemployment benefits, and it was sufficient
to establish identity theft. Id.
7
See Torres v. Wendy's Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (noting case turned
on when standing is established in data breach cases). The plaintiff did not allege the charges went
unreimbursed by his credit union, in connection with any fraudulent charges. Id. at 1281-82. It was
unclear what the out-of-pocket expenses were and if they related to the two charges the plaintiff
was exposed to. Id. at 1284.
74 See Cox v. Valley Hope Ass'n, No. 2:16-cv-04127-NKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119663 at
*7-8, (W.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2016) (noting cases finding standing largely contain evidence or
allegations of a breach). The complaint only alleged the laptop which contained personal
information was stolen; there was no suggestion the information was ever viewed or utilized. Id.
75 See Moyer, No. 14 C 561 at *14 (noting elevated risk may be too speculative to establish
Article III standing). Standing must be established based on non-speculative risk of harm. Id. at
*17, see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 568 U.S. 398, 415-16 (2013) (holding Article III
requirements are not fluid or relaxed under certain factual circumstances). Otherwise, "an
enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by
making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear." Id.
76 See Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01 175-LB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141945 at
*28 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015) (explaining cases of Ninth Circuit and relevancy of decisions finding
standing on speculative injury); see also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir.
2010) (noting plaintiffs spent substantial time monitoring their accounts). The Ninth Circuit found
injury-in-fact was sufficient to convey Article I standing. Id. at 1142-43.
7
See
Data
Breaches,
PRIVACY
RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches (last viewed Mar. 1, 2018) (noting number of data
breaches since 2005 to present is over 10,000,000,000).
78 See Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F3d 89 (4th Cir. 2003) (taking
"tangible" to mean "capable of being touched"). The court reasoned the drive which contained the
information was tangible in nature but the data stored on the hard drive was not. See id. at 95.
Accordingly, insurance policies that cover liability for physical damage to tangible property cannot
be held to cover damage to data and software because they are intangible and therefore unable to
be physically damaged. Id.
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number of breaches in the next decade is projected to reach over 1 trillion.7 9
An increasing majority of states have enacted legislation that obligates
private and government entities to notify individuals whose personal
information is compromised by data breaches so they are able to take the
appropriate precautionary measures.8 0 Data breaches present a pervasive
problem, that is increasingly broad in scope, and continuing to evolve as new
technology becomes widely utilized."

IV. ANALYSIS
Article Ell § 2 of the United States Constitution prescribes that
regardless of the nature or specific facts of the suit, imminent injury is a
82
necessary requirement for standing to bring an action in federal court.
Although imminent injury has proven to be a difficult concept in data breach
litigation and uncertain identity theft cases, the courts should not consider
waiving the standing requirements to expand the pool of potential
plaintiffs .83 Allowing claims to be heard before there is a concrete injury
could create havoc in the courts and unfairly prejudice defendants who have
not yet actually caused injury to the plaintiff. 84 The minimal standard for
proving injury serves to ensure a defendant could be found to have caused

7 See Anthony R. Zelle & Suzanne M. Whitehead, Cyber Liability: It's Just a Click Away, 33
J. of Ins. Reg. 6, 1 (2014) (discussing data breaches involving sensitive personal information).
Insurance companies have noticed the infrastructure weaknesses and responded by creating
coverage forms to protect against costs that are incurred in the event of a data breach. Id. at 2-3.
80 See id. at 3 (noting very few states lack security breach legislation). The consequences for
violating these statutes vary by state. Id. California was the first state to enact a notification state,
requiring businesses to disclose any known breach to any individuals whose information was
acquired by an unknown or unauthorized person. Id. California's statute also declares a waiver of
notice would contradict public policy and therefore would not be valid or enforceable. Id. Many
states modeled their own legislation after that of California, with small variances such as in Illinois'
version which requires specific, explicit language in the notification. Id. at 4.
See Bill Breakdown: AB 1723 (Identity Theft Resolution Act), PRIVACY RIGHTS
81
CLEARINGHOUSE, (Dec. 7, 2016 9:15 am), https://www.privacyrights.org/blog/bill-breakdown-ab1723-identity-theft-resolution-act (quoting Bureau of Justice Statistics reporting 17.6 million
identity theft victims in 2014). An often-overlooked issue in identity theft cases is the burden of
clearing the victim's name and resolving resulting credit issues can extend the negative impacts of
the theft far beyond the time it takes to discover identity theft occurred. Id.
82 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring "case" or "controversy" for sufficient Art. III
standing); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (acknowledging standing
requires injury-in-fact that is concrete and imminent rather than hypothetical).
83 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that litigants must
satisfy three elements in order to meet Art. III standing requirements).
84 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (explaining standing has always been required for argument to be
heard by court).
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harm sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for litigation."
Allowing a suit based on potential, speculative, and invalidated claims of
identity theft to proceed would unjustly subject potentially unsophisticated
defendants, who do not have the means to improperly use identifying
information in any way, to costly litigation.86
The requirements for standing cannot be diminished simply because
it is difficulty to prove identity theft after being a potential victim of data
breaches .17 As the cost of data breach litigation and related damages
continues to rise, being named as a defendant in a premature lawsuit for
identity theft can result in an insurmountable expense.88 A plaintiff may
bring a claim once the party can sufficiently allege that the defendant caused
an injury-in-fact. 8 9 Moreover, enforcing the requirement of standing as a
prerequisite for filing a suit in identity theft cases is consistent with other
areas of law, despite the difficulties posted by the requirement in the data
breach context.' Finally, after an initial determination that information has
been visited online, there are steps potential victims can take to minimize the
chance of identity theft that an individual could take prior to suffering an
actual injury.9 1 To relax the standing requirements simply to account for the
difficulty of identifying the injury before it occurs, is beyond the role of the
courts and would unjustly burden the defendant. 92
The issue of standing is difficult because of the lack of uniform
application and uncertainty as to when standing will exist in certain types of
85 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-63 (noting injury must be concrete and proximately caused by
defendant's conduct). These standards ensure that a plaintiff can prove the injury is fairly traceable
to the defendant. Id.
86 See id. at 560. (requiring causal connection between defendant's conduct and alleged
injury).
8 See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161 (explaining constitutional requirement of standing
principles).
88 See Carrie E. Cope & Ian Reynolds, Coverage Disputes Arising from Cyber Claims,
AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION

(Sept.

26,

2014

11:45

am),

http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/julyaug2014-cyber-coveragecoverage-disputes.htn-l (noting internet economy generates between two and three trillion dollars
annually and is growing rapidly). Cyber crime extracts between fifteen and twenty percent of the
total monetary value created by the internet. Id. A report by the Ponemon Institute indicates that
the United States suffers from among the most costly data breaches in the world, second only to
Germany. Id. However, only 37% of all United States data breaches are malicious or criminal in
nature. Id.
89 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (requiring causal connection between injury and conduct
traceable to defendant).
90 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting personal
information can be monitored for indications of identity theft).
91 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting steps to take
to reduce possibility of identity theft).
92 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (identifying standing as constitutional requirement).
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cases, such as data breach and identity theft litigation." Though Congress
could assist plaintiffs by creating statutory findings of standing, they have
decided not to, thereby clearly indicating all plaintiffs must satisfy the same
requirements under Article rn. 94 It is currently unclear whether class action
certification should occur prior to the determination of actual standing.95
Congress has previously facilitated plaintiffs in fulfilling the injury-in-fact
requirement comes in government actions where private parties lacked the
6
requisite standard for injury.9
The constitutional requirements for standing must not be superseded
7
by practical reality that some injuries are more difficult to anticipate .
Otherwise, a defendant who has not been connected to the harm complained
of could be held responsible for a speculative crime .98 Allegations by a
plaintiff must raise the right to relief above a speculative level, a feat that is
simply impossible in the realm of potential identity theft presumed on the
fact that personal information was accessed by an unauthorized third party.99
The policy rationale behind continuing the expansion of the technology
industry cannot be used to infringe on a defendant's right not to be burdened
with litigating a case that does not hold the required and necessary merits foo
Although the standing doctrine has been criticized for being too rigid
in requiring an actual injury, the doctrine is necessary for balancing the
01
protection of an individual who is being named as a defendant.
Additionally, the actual injury requirement is needed to prevent clogging

93 See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 487-88 (identifying standing as foundational prerequisite for
bringing suit in Art. lH federal courts).
94 See Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 855-56 (noting Congress could statutorily absolve standing
issue if it so chose). Congress' decision evidences its intent to abstain from lowering the standing
requirements despite the increasing potential for identity theft caused by the technology boom.
95 See id. (noting consistent application of standing requirement); see also Meltzer supra note
29 at 1569-70 (highlighting circuit split regarding order for determining class certification and
standing).
96 See Morrison, supra note 34 at 626-27 (discussing standing requirements for executive
officials).
97 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining importance of standing requirement not being
broadened or relaxed).
9
See id. (emphasizing expanding definition ofstanding would impermissibly extend federal
judicial power).
9 See supra note 16 (noting plaintiff must meet standing requirements to bring suit).
Proximate causation is not required, however the injury must be shown to be concrete and caused
by the defendant in order for allegations to rise above the level of speculation. Id.. Without meeting
this requirement, allegations are not sufficient to bring a suit. Id.
100 See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161 (emphasizing standing requirements are not just policy
standards of practice). These standing requirements are founded in the Constitution and cannot be
weakened by modem priorities or societal goals. Id.
101 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining reasons why standing has been
complicated and unclear issue).
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courts with speculative suits brought by uninjured plaintiffs.102 Furthermore,
without standing, if a potential law inflicted negative effects on a class of
people, the entire class would be able to bring a suit based merely on the
existence of the law rather than actual infliction of an injury.1 0 3 The source
of the alleged injury must be ascertained after the information has been
exposed to an unauthorized third person.10 4
Specifically pertaining to data-breach litigation, a plaintiff is not
found to have suffered an actual injury unless the allegations rise above
speculation that their information has been accessed."" The inconsistency
in circuit decisions regarding attainment of an injury after information is
vulnerable to inspection is hazardous because it incentivizes forum
shopping.106 In some instances, if there is evidence the accessed information
was used for malicious purposes, then it may be a different cognizable injury
that correlates to litigation before actual injury. 10 7 However, these instances
102 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (requiring distinct and palpable injury to bring
suit); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting Article III requirement embodies policy
goals). The individual bringing suit should be more than a mere bystander witnessing injury of
another. Id. Absent such a standing requirement there would be difficulty in distinguishing
bystanders from individuals who actually experienced the complained injury. Id.
103 See Whitmore, 485 U.S. at 161 (explaining interpretation of certain statutes may allow
frivolous claims by particular class of people). An individual is required to show injury was
suffered directly as a result of enforcing a particular law-otherwise there is no injury-in-fact as
required by Art. III. Id. Such an interpretation of a law could confer standing even though a court
may later find no standing to exist. Id.
104 See supra note 24 (expressing concept of standing considerably difficult to determine in
certain types of lawsuits).
1os See cases cited supra note 35 (discussing instances where courts found no injury-in-fact
when private data was wrongly accessed). Circuits disagree on whether accessing data, absent
improper use, is sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact. Id.
106 See cases cited supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting inconsistency amongst Ninth
and Third Circuit). The Third Circuit found no injury when a person accessed but did not use
plaintiffs' data. Id. Alternatively, in Krottner, the court found injury when plaintiffs merely had an
increased risk of harm from laptop theft. Id. These two viewpoints exemplify the difference
between circuits where an injury-in-fact occurs. Id. In both instances, the courts analyzed claims
after the information was accessed, but before the injury could be traced or was concrete. Id. The
opposite outcome of each case suggests an uncertainty amongst circuits in this area of law and a
need for further clarity when ordering data breach litigation. See also Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43-46.
But see Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143.
107 See Pisciotta,499 F.3d at 634 (identifying Seventh Circuit decision satisfying risk of data
theft standard after information accessed). The malicious hacker's sophistication and the evidence
showing the hacker obtained the information for malicious purposes, created more of a foreseeable
issue. Id. at 632. Since the plaintiff had not alleged complete financial loss, the court held it was
not an injury-in-fact, nor was it concrete enough under typical standing requirements. Id. There
was no injury founded unless one assumed the identity theft was going to happen from the data
breach. Id. at 634. However, the court found standing because the future harm would not have been
there absent of the defendant's actions. Id. Although the court found standing simply because the
future harm could not potentially be foreseen without this initial move, there was no argument an
injury occurred at the time the court analyzed the complaint. Id. at 638-39.
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should not give rise to a finding of an injury-in-fact absent a concrete injury
because more is required than mere guessing and assessing potential future
problems.108 Failure to require a concrete injury can result in a charge that
will never occur and require a court to estimate the extent of what that
These problems are becoming
damage could potentially occur. 109
nonexistent in cases where the plaintiff has suffered an actual injury, as the
requirement for showing an injury can be met without estimating what can
happen between information being compromised and a possible identity
theft. 10
Allowing claims to be heard before evaluating necessary standing
will not be efficient for courts and prejudice defendants who are innocent of
the claim in question."' Defendants should fairly receive protection from
proceedings that do not meet the requisite level of standing; or else
defendants will have an unfair expectation of defending themselves in a
lawsuit where no injury occurred. 12 A potential factor to consider is if the
hacker was malicious or otherwise advanced, as opposed to novice and
unsophisticated in accessing the information. 113 A malicious or advanced
hacker more likely show the need for monitoring devices, however, there are
10 See Pisciotta,499 F.3d at 634 (explaining no financial loss or injury when plaintiff filed
complaint).
109 See Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1323 (noting plaintiffs experiencing identity theft need concrete
injury to receive monetary damages). If the plaintiff suffered identity theft, then they will have
concrete injuries required under the Article m standing doctrine. Id. Furthermore, in Resnick the
plaintiffs suffered identity theft when the defendant failed to secure the stolen information when
fraudulently opening bank accounts and using the information for other subsequent transactions.
Id.
110 See id. (highlighting injuries suffered met standing requirement). Courts can redress and
give remedy for previously occurring injuries, as they can show the injury's basis is on the actions
or failure to secure the plaintiffs information. Id. at 1324. Without pleadings showing the
connection between the two instances, the only way a plaintiff can show who caused the injury is
by evidencing the timing of the two incidents. Id. Timing does not show clear intention of standing
or the proper and appropriate use of courts for bringing claims in a lawsuit. Id.
111 See Stollenwerk,254 F. Appx at 667 (noting time and sequence alone insufficient to warrant
identity theft action). In Stollenwork, the court determined there was a causal relationship because
the plaintiff gave the defendant personal information, and the fraudulent transactions began six
weeks after the plaintiffs hard drives with were stolen. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare
Aliance, 254 F. App'x 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the court noted if the claim was
based on time alone, than the claim would be lacking the explanation of a logical relationship
between the two events which would be sufficient enough to create standing. Id.
112 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting, standing is insufficient on timing of
circumstances if no logical relationship between events exists).
113 See Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (finding investigation produced evidence hack malicious
rather than novice). No person in the class claimed they suffered monetary loss, but the
investigation showed that their banking information had been accessed in the breach which led to
individuals requesting monitoring of their information. Id. The court used Hendricks to support
that there was no state law that viewed the purchase of a creditor monitoring device as a loss.
Hendricks, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
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still circuits finding these monitoring devices are insufficient for the
purposes of constituting a loss." 4 In all instances, the plaintiff must have
expressed an injury that is both established and concrete to withstand a
motion to dismiss the case, otherwise the injury is simply insufficient to
continue with litigation."'5 Despite a court finding sufficient constitutional
standing from the defendant's actions, the court must also find a sufficient
basis for relief to ensure they are hearing an appropriate case-incontroversy." 6 Absent immediate injury, it is simply unfair to hold future
speculative injury against a defendant when no proximate injury can be
found.' '7 A court is more likely to hold for measures to prevent the effects
of identity theft when actual injuries occur rather than speculative or
potential injuries."s Future potential injury, even in situations where access
of the information occurred, can cause the court to have a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.119 In fairness, even if the plaintiff did not suffer monetary
loss in connection with identity theft, any facts pointing to the occurrence of
identity theft will be found sufficient. 120
Article Ell is a requirement to ensure that jurisdiction is found in a
case or controversy, and not anything more or less unclear than that to reach
I14 See Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Ban Corp., 499 F.3d 629,630-33 (explaining loss not created by
purchasing credit monitoring device). These preventative devices cannot be seen as a loss when
they are potentially purchasable. Id.
115 See cases cited supra note 44 and accompanying text (emphasizing to move past dismissal
motions must express sufficient injury). In Lambert, the court determined that the theft and
monitoring prevention was an injury-in-fact because the plaintiffs faced increased risk of identity
theft. 517 F.3d at 435. The circuits have held that a defendant's inability to secure personal
information has created standing on preventative measures because the defendant caused the
compromise of sensitive information. Id.
116 See Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266 at *5
(D.N.J. July 31, 2006) (noting courts still need basis for relief after meeting constitutional needs).
Injury for standing is one piece; the subsequent issue is the basis for remedial relief from the court.
Id. In Giordano, the court determined that credit monitoring did not constitute an injury necessary
for standing. Id. The issue can become null when there is no possibility for relief without a
sufficient injury to remedy. Id.
117 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (requiring plaintiffs show immediate injury for
satisfying standing requirement). Other courts have held that alleged damages are not sufficient
injury-in-fact unless there is a definitive immediate injury. Id.
11s See supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting actual identity theft clear factor in
complaint allegations). Including actual injury in the complaint absolves the issue of the court
inappropriately, granting a remedy for an injury that will never exist. Id. This is an important factor
to prevent compensating a plaintiff that did not suffer harm and reduces the burden placed on a
defendant who would be forced to face unfair mitigation expenses. Id.
119 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining courts absent injury court may lack
subject matter jurisdiction). Potential injury does not equate to an injury that a court can easily
remedy and address, thus, causing an issue of lacking subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
120 See cases cited supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting actual injury without
monetary loss still sufficient for standing). Standing can be found without injury but, courts will
be face with determining if the claim is cognizable. Id.
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the judicial branch before a court can entertain the action.1 21 Plaintiffs cannot
decide to make costly decisions to monitor credit and personal information
online and then use those costs to invoke standing without a concrete
injury. 122 Although the case or controversy requirement is a matter of degree,
these instances do not constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing
because they do not meet the necessary requirements under the standard. 1 2 3
Although data accessed by an unauthorized individual causes a need
for concern, this concern cannot create a sliding scale to constitute standing
prior to a certain or impending injury. 1 24 Courts involved in data breach cases
must provide deference to potential defendants by not allowing frivolous
claims with potential allegations that the plaintiff's data was seen or accessed
by the defendant because there is no showing of imminent injury .125 In those
instances, there is nothing that can show the injury is imminent and therefore
appropriate to bring suit. 12 6 Although the dissent in Clapper v. Amnesty
Internationalargued that the word "certainly" contained within the phrase
"certainly impending" requires a reasonable probability of harm rather than
a certainty of injury to the plaintiff, this argument still falls short of the
necessary standing requirements .127 In cases where there is a potential or
uncertain access of the plaintiff's information, there is not a reasonable
probability that the individual will then use the information in a way to cause
the type of harm, which is required to bring a claim.128 As the majority
correctly concluded, alleviating the rigid burden of showing a necessary
imminent injury would open the courts to a multitude of baseless claims .129

See Clapper,568 U.S. at 407 (explaining standing required to sue under case or controversy
requirement). The role of Article ILI is to prevent diluting standing so the courts do not hear
speculation. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407 (2013).
122 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (highlighting standing insufficient in decisions
based on fear of future harm). Imputing these decisions do not create standing unless there is a
solid basis for the reasoning behind the preventive measures. Id.
123 See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining injury-in-fact matter of degree
according to dissent).
124 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating injury cannot just be highly likely but
must be sufficiently impending). Despite past behavior of the government in Clapper,there must
be more than just a potential likelihood for a desire to access material. 568 U.S. at 427-28.
125 See cases cited supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing dissent and majority view
on imminence of injury).
126 See cases cited supra note 62 and accompanying text (emphasizing mandatory requirement
injury is impending and not speculative).
127 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 431-34 (clarifying the certainty requirements).
128 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 433-49 (discussing language "certainly impending" arguably
problematic). This requirement or flexibility allows plaintiffs to allege reasonable probability
standing. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 431-32.
129 See Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (holding requirement of necessary imminence for
standing to be sufficient probability to bring claim).
121
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In data breach cases, increased risk of identity fraud or theft must be
shown to be clearly imminent to have constitutional standing under Article
E, regardless of the sometimes illusive nature of future injury claims.130 If
an allegation of increased risk of identity theft could establish standing, then
charging a defendant with a speculative risk of an injury, absent any evidence
of actual injury would be unfair. 13 1 The defendant should not bear the burden
of attempting to show they will not cause harm, absent standards to
particularize the injury and ensure it is within imminent time.13 2 The
defendant's protection must be equal to the plaintiff's to ensure fair
proceedings throughout the judicial process.13 3 The cost for mitigating
increased risk of identity theft can be expensive, and if these costs can be
seen as an injury, then the defendant can always be charged, so long as the
plaintiff took the steps to incur mitigation expenses. 34
A reasonable requirement will not necessarily contravene plaintiffs
from bringing a suit when they have appropriate injury or certain impending
injuries from data breaches .
If personal information has been used for
identity theft or fraudulent conveyances, the plaintiff will still be able to seek
remedial measures .136 Here, the issue is the matter of bringing a claim before

130 See id. (discussing increased identity theft risk not actual
injury-in-fact). This is critical to
prevent forced litigation on a defendant who did not cause an actual injury-in-fact, or showing to
necessarily be causing an injury-in-fact in the near future. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998
F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2014). Despite the plaintiffs in Galariabeing ten times more
likely to be fraud victims, it is not the likelihood of injury that will allow a plaintiff to bring a data
breach claim. Id. A likelihood of injury does not establish actual injury, nor can it replace the injury
requirements. Id.
131 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating allegations of future
injuries not
sufficient unless certain). Requiring an injury-in-fact and showing it to be traceable to the
defendants is necessary to establish constitutional standing to bring a claim in front of a court.
Books v. City of Eikhart, 235 F.3d 292,299 (7th Cir. 2000). Absent these injuries, standing is not
sufficient if only based on future injuries. Id. Otherwise, there would be a rebuttable presumption
for standing, burdening the defendant to also provide evidence that there is not enough injury for
standing. Id. As the plaintiff is the party seeking remedy in the court, it is understandable they must
furnish evidence that standing is proper and therefore their case may continue. Id.
132 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating sufficient standing
required for court to
have constitutional power to hear).
"3
See cases cited supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating future injury too
speculative and is not actual injury for constitutional purposes). Absent these safeguards, a plaintiff
could begin litigation on a defendant who has not availed himself or been charged with any injury
capable of being noted. Id. The design of standing is to prevent such speculative nature. Id.
134 See In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *11 (explaining
expenses for mitigating increased risk of identity theft not sufficient for standing).
135 See Clapper,568 U.S. at 409-10 (explaining injury
will establish standing).
136 See In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (explaining
standing met when plaintiffs
suffered fraudulent charges and restricted bank accounts). In instances of actual injury, the plaintiff
will have the ability to seek judicial relief if they suffered monetary losses from fraudulent activity.
In re Michaels Stores Pin PadLitig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518,527 (N.D. 111. 2011).
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knowing that an injury will certainly occur, rather than waiting to adjudicate
a certain claim on its merits .137 Creating standing before injury requires a lot
of discretion, such as, choosing different types of mitigation protection,
38
canceling credit cards and using monitoring devices.' Standing exists once
an injury has actually occurred, or if there is sufficient evidence to show an
injury is certain to happen.1 39 The standing requirements involving an injury
simply prohibit claims that have insufficient evidence to bring about a cause
of action.140 In instances of concrete injury, the standing issue is obsolete
and this necessary safeguard for defendants does not hinder a plaintiff who
suffered an injury.141 Absent requiring sufficient injury, a device allegedly
stolen could equate a data breach, so long as there is personal information on
the device.1 42
The Article III requirements are standards that the court must apply
43
Article
uniformly to hold regulatory weight in a judicial procedure.
standing must not be conferred on an unfounded, subject paranoia of
potential identity theft, absent required evidence of an actual injury.144
V. CONCLUSION
The defendants in data breach cases must receive protection from
lawsuits that are unfair, unreasonable, or otherwise frivolous without further
evidence of an injury. The injury must be concrete or imminent for a plaintiff
137

See cases cited supra note 68 (reviewing instances where injury-in-fact met, granting

plaintiffs sufficient standing).
138 See Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. No. 14-cv-4787, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171142, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (indicating protection unnecessary after individual cancelled
their card). The potential for identity theft is not sufficient for standing in this instance. Id. After
the plaintiff canceled the card, the potential risk became null. Id.
139 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining standing clearly established where
plaintiff suffered injury and harm). In instances where the defendant had already alleged theft of
funds, then the injury establishes as certainly impending. Id.
140 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating concrete and previously occurring
injuries sufficient). These parties may come to court once they have experienced monetary
damages from identity theft or have evidence that identity theft occurred. Id
141 See United States v. De La Cruz, 835 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2016) (discussing concrete injury
sufficiently establishes claim for standing).
142 See Cox v. Valley Hope Ass'n, No. 2:16-cv-04127-NKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119663
at *7-8 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2016) (noting stolen laptop absent proof information viewed or used
does not show imminent injury). Aside from the stolen laptop, the record had no evidence to
establish anything further occurred this far, and there was nothing to indicate that there was a certain
impending injury regarding the information stored on the device. Id.
143 See cases cited supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting Article III does not lower
court's standard).
14 See cases cited supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining unfounded fears should
not be found sufficient to create standing).
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to fairly bring a claim that is applicable for adjudication. When there is no
evidence of an injury occurring or that will occur potential identity theft is
not sufficient. Defendants must fairly receive protection from unfair and
nonexistent claims.
The requirement of standing ensures courts are not adjudicating
claims that would never come to light, and to further ensure that justice is
given to both the plaintiff and defendant. Absent a need for showing cause,
every potential lost phone or computer containing sensitive information
threatens to cause expensive burdens for a defendant. As our technology
continues to advance and our dependency on virtually stored information
increases, we must ensure defendants meet the justice of injury requirements
prior to the enforcement of litigation against a plaintiff. Therefore, the
holding in Clapper must stand and be expanded on to allow for more rigid
standards of sufficient injury on a plaintiff's behalf prior to bringing a
lawsuit.
Brooke McNeill

